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SHOOTOUT AT THE ECJ CORRAL:
MANAGEMENT 4, LABOR 0; EUROPEAN
LABOR DISPUTE LAW AFTER VIKING LINE
Carol Daugherty Rasnic
Hell hath no fury like a union scorned.1
INTRODUCTION
With an economy that is becoming increasingly globalized, an
undergraduate labor law course must include at least minimal
coverage of European Union (EU) law. The usual perception of a
union-friendly Europe has been surprisingly altered by four European
Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions in late 2007 and 2008. Although
this shift might be transitory if new directives revert to the prior
secured rights of union members in Europe, it is a critical component
of a labor law course for business students.
These decisions began with International Transport Workers’
Federation v. Viking Line ABP (Viking),2 decided in December 2007,
followed shortly thereafter by three similar defeats to union efforts to
dictate management policies.3 The ire of labor unions, legal
academics, and practitioners has provoked a flurry of activity at the
European Commission level.

Professor of Law Emerita at Virginia Commonwealth University.
The author is grateful to the School of Law at The University of Edinburgh
for providing research support for this article through the Sir Neil
MacCormick Fellowship.
1
This is an adaptation of “Nor Hell a Fury, like a Woman scorn’d,”
from William Congreve’s “The Mourning Bride.” WILLIAM CONGREVE, The
Mourning Bride act 3, sc. 1, l. 458, reprinted in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF
WILLIAM CONGREVE 320, 361 (Herbert Davis et al. eds., Univ. Chicago Press
1967) (1697).
2
Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp.Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP,
2007 E.C.R. I-10779.
3
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767; Case C-346/06, Rüffert v.
Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989; Case C-319/06, Comm’n v.
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008 E.C.R. I-04323.

354

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS

[Vol. 9.2

This article explains some characteristics of domestic labor law
in EU member states, the evolving nature of the EU, the four ECJ
decisions, the primary bases for objections, and proposed changes in
EU legislation. Intermittent comparisons with counterpart U.S.
federal law are used to draw distinctions between labor-management
laws that confront the American company engaged in business within
the EU.

I.

EUROPEAN DOMESTIC LABOR LAWS

Most European countries are social states, with workers
normally entitled to numerous social benefits.4 For example,
workers may benefit from unemployment compensation funded
through taxes on the worker as well as his employer, much like social
security in the United States.5 Additional social benefits include
prolonged maternity and/or parental leaves, generally with pay. The
longest are in Spain (seventy-two months), Germany (thirty-nine and
one half months), Finland (thirty-eight months), France (thirty-seven
and one half months), Sweden (thirty-six and one half months), and
Portugal (thirty-six months).6 Annual paid leave policies also tend to
be generous: four weeks in Great Britain,7 twenty-four working days
in Germany,8 and thirty working days in Austria.9 In contrast, the
U.S. Family & Medical Leave Act only provides a relatively short
combined period of up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for qualified
4

The term “social state” and “socialist state” are frequently confused.
A social state is one that provides comprehensive social benefits through
heavy taxation, whereas a socialist state is one controlled and owned, at least
in part, by the government.
5
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6
Christopher J. Ruhm, Policies to Assist Parents with Young Children,
21 FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2011, at 37, 41 tbl.2.
7
Working Time Regulations, 1998, S.I. 1998/1833, art. 2, ¶ 13
(Gr.Brit.).
8
Mindesturlaubsgesetz für Arbeitnehmer [BUrlG] [Minimum Leave
Act for Employees], Jan. 8, 1963, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBL. I], last
amended by Gesetz [G], May 11, 2002, BGBL. I §§ 1, 3 (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/burlg/gesamt.pdf.
9
URLAUBSGESETZ [HOLIDAYS ACT] July 7, 1976, BUNDESGESETZBLATT
[BGBL I] No. 390/1976, § 2 ¶ 1 (Austria), available at http://www.ris.
bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer
=10008376&ShowPrintPreview=True (mandating paid leave of thirty-six
working days for a worker with twenty-five years of service).
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workers for reasons including serious illness of the employee; serious
illness of the employee’s close family member (parent, child, or
spouse); and/or birth or adoption of a child.10
European workers also commonly have substantial statutory job
protections.11 Domestic job protections throughout Europe are
antithetical to American employment-at-will rules that prevail in
many states.12 Statutory works councils are typical in European
domestic law and an employer must consult with this body of elected
workers prior to making many decisions normally reserved for
management in the American workplace, such as termination or
reassignment of a worker and determination of workplace rules.13
Trade unions in European countries differ from those in the
United States in three major respects. First, European countries do
not have the usual public-private sector division. Private sector
unions in the United States are governed either by the 1926 Railway
Labor Act,14 which applies to railway and airline workers, or the
Taft–Hartley Act,15 covering all other industries and businesses in the
private sector. Federal workers are subject to the Civil Service
Reform Act,16 and additional state statutes may apply to employees
of the individual state governments.

10
29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (applying only to
employers with at least fifty employees).
11
See, e.g., Kündigungsschutzgesetz [KSchG] [Employment Protection
Act], Aug. 25, 1969, BGBL. I at 1317, last amended by G, Mar. 26, 2008,
BGBL. I at 444 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-iminternet.de/kschg/BJNR004990951.html#BJNR004990951BJNG000100311.
12
See Carol Daugherty Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the
Employment Contract: Contrasting U.S. “Employment-at-Will” Rule with
the Worker Statutory Protections Against Dismissal in European Community
Countries, 4 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 441 (1995).
13
See, e.g., Betriebsverfassungsgesetz [BetrVG] [Works Constitution
Act], Sept. 25, 2001, BGBL. I at 2518, last amended by G, July 29, 2009,
BGBL. I at 2424 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/
englisch_betrvg/englisch_betrvg.html#p0052 (requiring a works council for
companies with five or more employees).
14
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151–188 (2006).
15
Labor Management Relations (Taft–Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141–187 (2006).
16
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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A second difference is the scope of what constitutes the
employer in a collective bargaining agreement. To be sure, there are
multi-employer collective bargaining contracts in the United States,
but the European concept is fundamentally different. Unions in
Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, and Sweden are organized at the industry level—all
companies within a designated industry are covered by the same
collective bargaining agreement.17 Other countries, such as Belgium
and Romania, determine the content of union-employer contracts by
statute.18
A third distinction is the saturation level of union membership in
Europe. A 2011 survey by the European Trade Union Institute
(ETUI)19 stated that the percentage of union membership in the
workforce varies from 98% in Austria and France to 15% in
Lithuania, with a trans-European average of 66%.20 This contrasts
starkly with U.S. figures, especially in the private sector, where
union membership is estimated to be as low as 7.6%.21 Even in the
more unionized public sector, the membership rate is still only
40.7%.22 The message for an American company doing business in
Europe is that it must be prepared to contend with strong organized
labor.

17
L. Fulton, European Trade Union Institute, Collective Bargaining,
WORKER-PARTICIPATION.EU, http://www.worker-participation.eu/NationalIndustrial-Relations/Across-Europe (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
18
Id.
19
ETUI is the research and training center for the European Trade
Union Confederation, a self-described umbrella association of all European
trade unions. About ETUI, EUR. TRADE UNION INST., http://www.etu
i.org/About-Etui (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
20
Fulton, supra note 17. Belgium, Slovenia, Finland, Portugal, and
Sweden all have union membership of 90% or higher, and the Netherlands,
Denmark, Italy, Cyprus, Spain, Norway, Greece, Germany, and Luxembourg
are between 60% and 90%. Id.
21
Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members—
2011 app. at tbl.3 (Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/archives/union2_01272012.pdf.
22
Id. (noting federal workers at 33.2%, state workers at 35%, and local
government workers at 46.6%).
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II. THE CHANGING FOCUS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The moving principal behind what now constitutes the European
Union was French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, who believed
that any lasting peace in post-World War II Europe necessitated an
economic treaty.23 The 1951 Treaty of Paris24 created the European
Coal and Steel Community, a single authority over all French and
German production in those industries. The Treaty of Paris was
augmented in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome,25 which created the
European Economic Community (EEC) and replaced the singular
“community” with the plural “communities.”26 The EEC was
authorized to achieve common agricultural, transport, and
competition policies; to establish a customs tariff and common
commercial policies with regard to external countries; and to
implement a common market.27
The 1957 establishment of the first “pillar,” the economic
community, was later expanded by the Treaty of Maastricht28 in 1992
to include a second pillar on common foreign policy and security,
and a third pillar on cooperation in the fields of “justice and home
affairs.”29
These expansions reflect the increasing scope of
governance by the Community’s institutions. Subsequent treaties

23

Eur. Comm’n, Robert Schuman: The Architect of the European
Integration Project, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/euhistory/founding-fathers/index_en.htm#box_9 (follow “Read more about
Robert Schuman” hyperlink) (last visited on Feb. 22, 2013).
24
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. The specific powers
delegated to the Community can be found in Article 3 of the Treaty. Id. at
147. However, the Community’s powers expired fifty years after the Treaty
entered into force. Id. at 227.
25
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The Treaty of Rome
subsumed and supplanted the Treaty of Paris in 2002.
26
Compare the various articles of Treaty of Paris, supra note 25, with
Treaty of Rome, supra note 26.
27
Treaty of Rome, supra note 25. For a discussion of the EEC’s
original purpose, see JOHN FAIRHURST, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 5–7
(Pearson Educ. Ltd. ed., 8th ed. 2010).
28
Treaty on European Union art. B, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 253.
29
Id.
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adding to these social policies included the Treaty of Amsterdam30
which declared the Community to have been founded upon “the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights,”31 equality
between the sexes, and improvement of the quality of the
environment.32 The most recent document, the 2009 Treaty of
Lisbon, entailed perhaps the most substantial expansion.33 Lisbon
merged the three pillars, replaced references to “Communities” with
“European Union,”34 and mandated that the EU “combat social
exclusion and discrimination and . . . promote social justice.”35
These newly legislated EU social rights have generated a wealth of
legal academic literature.36 What began in post-World War II Europe
aimed at freeing the movement of goods, services, capital, and
persons and dispensing with inter-country trade barriers, developed
into a common market with economic free movement adding further
to those original economic goals. Since Maastricht the EU has
become more oriented toward social policy.37 This relatively recent
focus on social rights contrasts sharply with the ECJ’s original
emphasis on market freedom.38
In addition to the EU’s expansion of centralized powers over
member states and its added social dimension, the EU has also
increased the breadth of its geographic area. What began as six
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands) has grown in stages to twenty-seven countries, with
30

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts,
Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam].
31
Id. art. 1.
32
Id. art. 2.
33
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C
306) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
34
Id. art. 2.
35
Id. art. 3.
36
See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Grainne de Burca & Bruno de
Witte eds., 2005); STEPHEN C. SIEBERSON, DIVIDING LINES BETWEEN THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS MEMBER STATES: THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY OF
LISBON (2008).
37
Reingard Zimmer, Labour Market Politics through Jurisprudence:
The Influence of the Judgments of the European Court of Justice (Viking,
Laval, Rüffert, Luxembourg) on Labour Market Policies, 7 GER. POL’Y STUD.
211, 213 (2011).
38
See id. at 213–14 (analyzing the changing face of the EU).
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Croatia scheduled to become the twenty-eighth member state in
2013.39
The EU is a gargantuan trading bloc with which
international businesses must be prepared to reckon, not only
economically, but also with regard to social rights in the employment
setting.
III. VIKING ET AL. AND RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION

LAW
A. INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT WORKERS’ FEDERATION V.
VIKING LINE ABP40
Viking Line ABP, a Finnish company that operated the vessel
Rosella from Helsinki to Estonia, announced in October 2003 plans
to reflag the ship to Estonia.41 Paying lower Estonian wages to crew
members was one way to address the company’s financial
problems.42 Viking’s collective bargaining agreement with the
Finnish Seaman’s Union (FSU) expired in November of the same
year, but FSU took collective action to stop Viking from reflagging
the vessel.43 The union, determined to stop “social dumping,”44
requested the London-based International Transport Workers’
Federation (ITF) to ask its members outside of Finland not to
negotiate with Viking.45 Viking challenged the boycotts in a British
court46 thereby avoiding the more pro-labor Finnish courts.47

39

From 6 to 27 members, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-27-members/index
_en.htm (last updated Sept. 24, 2012); Croatia, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-country-informa
tion/croatia/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2012).
40
Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp.Workers’ Fed’n v. Viking Line ABP,
2007 E.C.R. I-10779.
41
Id. ¶ 6.
42
Id.
43
Id. ¶ 13.
44
Social dumping is the importing of laborers from countries with low
wages to perform services in wealthier countries.
45
Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶¶ 7–8.
46
The participants of the British labor union, ITF, vested British courts
with jurisdiction according to the Brussels Regulation, 44/2001, as amended.
47
Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶ 22.
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Viking’s claim was based upon its freedom of establishment
under European law.48 In a referral action, the ECJ adopted a
“proportionality” test. The Court held that although a union has the
fundamental right to take collective action (the ECJ’s first
recognition of this right as fundamental), this right is not without
restriction. The union has the burden of proving a serious threat of
job loss to its members and if so, that the collective action is no
greater than necessary to achieve the intended end.49 Moreover, the
ECJ held that the national court is the appropriate forum for
determining whether an alternate dispute mechanism is available at
the domestic judicial level.50 The decision was criticized as a sudden
prioritization of the right of establishment over a union’s
fundamental rights.51
B. LAVAL UN PARTNERI LTD V. SVENSKA
BYGGNADSARBETAREFÖRBUNDET52
Baltic Bygg was a Latvian subsidiary of another Latvian
company, Laval.53 All employees of both were also Latvian, and a
Latvian union maintained a valid collective agreement with Laval
and its subsidiary.54 Baltic was under contract to refurbish an old
school in neighboring Sweden.55 The Swedish Building Workers’
Union (SBWU) demanded the Latvian employer pay its workers the
amount payable to Swedish workers, an average of 145Swedish
krona per hour (U.S. $16.74), two times the amount for which the
workers had collectively bargained.56 The company refused and

48

Id. ¶ 7; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 49, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, [hereinafter
TFEU].
49
Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779 ¶¶ 81–90.
50
Id.
51
See K.D. EWING, THE INST. OF EMP’T RTS., THE DRAFT MONTI II
REGULATION: AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO VIKING AND LAVAL ¶¶ 4–9
(2012).
52
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767.
53
Id. ¶ 27.
54
Id. ¶ 28.
55
Id. ¶ 27.
56
Id. ¶¶ 30–31.
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SBWU blockaded the site of the school.57 SBWU’s blockade was
joined by sympathy picketers, including the Swedish Electricians’
Union, effectively preventing ingress and egress, which led Laval to
ask the Swedish Labor Court to declare the collective action illegal.58
Although the Swedish court refused to grant an injunction,59 it
forwarded the case to the ECJ for a determination of Swedish law’s
compliance with the EU Posted Workers Directive (PWD)60 and the
freedom to provide services.
The PWD provides that a firm hiring laborers from another
member state must assure those workers the minimum protections of
the host country’s law, including minimum rates of pay.61 The
directive also permits, but does not mandate, that the host company
adopt policies that will apply to posted workers in cases “of public
policy provisions.”62 This minimum protection includes conditions
in national collective bargaining agreements, provided that they are
“universally applicable.”63
The ECJ again applied the Viking rule of proportionality.64
Further, it construed the PWD as requiring only minimum statutory
protections, and Sweden has no minimum wage statute.65 Greater
protections than the minimum are required only when the host
country can show that collectively bargained terms constitute crucial
public policy.66 The ECJ held there was no such threat to any
fundamental interest of society, and that requiring more would go
beyond the rule of proportionality under Viking.67 On remand, the
same Swedish Labor Court that had refused to enjoin the unions’
boycott applied the ECJ ruling, holding the unions liable to the
57

Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶¶ 38–39.
59
Arbetsdomstolen [AD] [Labor Court] 2004-12-22 ref A 268/04
(Swed.).
60
Directive 96/71/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 December 1996 Concerning the Posting of Workers in the Framework of
the Provision of Services, 1997 O.J. (L 018) 1.
61
Id. art. 3.1(c).
62
Id. art. 3.10.
63
Id. art. 3.1, 3.8.
64
Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska
Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767, ¶ 94.
65
Id. ¶ 24.
66
Id. ¶ 117.
67
Id. ¶ 119.
58
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company in the amount of 2.7 million Swedish krona (U.S.
$410,965).68
After the decisions in Viking and Laval, the events surrounding a
labor dispute between the British Airline Pilots Association
(BALPA) and British Airways (BA) generated claims that the ECJ’s
holdings had a chilling effect on union collective action.69 In early
2008, when BA announced plans to establish a French subsidiary in
order to service more markets, the BALPA voiced concerns that
lower wages for the subsidiary’s pilots might be used as leverage by
BA in upcoming talks for a renewed contract.70 When negotiations
failed, BA voted to strike.71 To preempt any attempt by BA to enjoin
the strike, BALPA filed a petition for declaratory judgment that the
planned strike was lawful as proportionate to its interests under
Viking.72 BA counterclaimed by seeking an injunction and damages
for an estimated loss of 100 million pound sterling (U.S. $158.4
million) per day.73 Shortly after a hearing before the High Court but
prior to a decision, BALPA withdrew its charges in the face of a
strict deadline.74 Under British statutory law, a vote to strike is valid
for only four months.75 A lengthy process in the British court system
could have driven the union into bankruptcy.76
A similar labor dispute occurred on American soil in 2011. The
much-publicized controversy between the Boeing Company and
68

Arbetsdomstolen [AD] [Labor Court] 2009-12-02 ref A 268/04
(Swed.).
69
See, e.g., K.D. Ewing & John Hendy, A Tale of Two Cities:
Strasbourg and Luxembourg and the Rights to Collective Bargaining and to
Strike, Address at International Conference: The Evolution of Labor Law in
Europe Under the Pressure of (Neo) Liberal Economics 2–4 (2009),
available at http://www.terralaboris.be/spip/IMG/doc_Texte_EWI NG_et_
HENDY.doc.
70
Id. at 2.
71
Id. at 3.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 5–6.
74
Id. at 4.
75
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1992, c. 52, §§ 223–24
(U.K.).
76
See generally THE LAVAL AND VIKING CASES: FREEDOM OF SERVICES
AND ESTABLISHMENT V. INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
AREA AND RUSSIA 172–73 (Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2009) (detailing a
chronology of these proceedings).
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International Association of Machinists (IAM) also involved efforts
of a powerful union to block a management decision purportedly
made on economic grounds. Boeing, headquartered in Seattle,
Washington, had constructed a $750 million factory in South
Carolina, where the company planned to build a new line of aircraft:
the Dreamliner.77 In September 2009, workers at the South Carolina
plant voted to decertify IAM as their bargaining representative.78
The Acting General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) filed an unfair labor practice action against Boeing79
charging it with coercion of and discrimination against union
workers.80 The requested remedy, an order that Boeing construct the
Dreamliners at the Washington plant, rather than in South Carolina,

77

Tim Devaney, Boeing Opens $750 Million Plant in South Carolina:
Aerospace Giant Defying National Labor Relations Board’s Complaint,
WASH. TIMES, June 10, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.co
m/news/2011/jun/10/boeing-opens-750-million-plant-south-carolina/.
78
Darrin Hoop, Boeing Wins Decert Vote in S.C., 707 SOCIALIST
WORKER (Oct. 6, 2009), http://socialistworker.org/2009/10/06/boeing-winsdecert-vote. Some reports incorrectly referred to South Carolina as a “nonunion” state, rather than a right-to-work state, leaving the inference that
workers were prohibited from joining a union. (Section 14(b) of the 1947
amendments to the 1935 Wagner Act permitted states to enact legislation
making unenforceable a collective bargaining agreement that required union
membership as a condition of continued employment. National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164 (2006). States with such laws are referred to
as right-to-work states.) See, e.g., Noel Brinkerhoff & David Wallechinsky,
Boeing Launches First Non-Union Airplane, ALL GOV (May 07, 2012),
http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/boeing-launches-first-non-unionairplane?news=844437. However, that prohibition is expressly barred by
federal law. Norris–LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
79
Brief for Defendant, Boeing v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers District Lodge 751 (N.L.R.B. 2011) (No. 19–CA–
32431); Hans A. von Spakovsky & James Sherk, National Labor Relations
Board Overreach Against Boeing Imperils Jobs and Investment, 66 LEGAL
MEMORANDUM (Heritage Found.), May, 11, 2011, at 2, available at
http://thf_media.
s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/lm66.pdf;
Steven
Greenhouse, Labor Board Tells Boeing New Factory Breaks Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/busines
s/21boeing.html?_r=0.
80
Von Spakovsky, supra note 83, at 3. This would constitute a
violation of federal law. See Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, sec.
101, § 8(a)(1), (3), 61 Stat. 136, 140–41 (1947).
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provoked political outrage.81 Claiming that Boeing had engaged in an
unlawful “runaway shop,” the General Counsel was faced with the
established “but-for” test: proof that the company’s decision to
produce the aircraft at the South Carolina plant would not have been
made but for anti-union animus.82 In determining the lawfulness of
transferring work to another plant, the NLRB looks to many factors;
proof of animus alone will not render a decision unlawful if it would
have been made in the absence of ill will toward the union.83
The company responded that (1) its Washington workers
suffered neither job losses nor negative employment consequences,
and customer demand had actually increased production at the main
plant; (2) “no work [had] been transferred from Washington to South
Carolina;” and (3) “the decision . . . was made for legitimate
economic . . . reasons,” including the costly fifty-eight-day IAM
strike in 2008.84 If the NLRB had received the remedy it requested,
the effect would have been a de facto closure of the South Carolina
facility.85

81

See, e.g., Amy Bingham, Obama Breaks Silence About Boeing v.
(July
19,
2011)
available
at
NLRB,
ABC
N EWS
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/06/obama-breaks-silence-aboutboeing-v-nlrb. See also Greenhouse, supra note 80.
82
See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62, 67 (3d Cir. 1978)
(discussing the need for anti-union animus).
83
See, e.g., id.; Robert A. Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching up with the
Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. L. REV. 1135 (1973) (discussing the proving of the
runaway shop).
84
Steven M. Bernstein, The NLRB’s Dreamliner Complaint: a Tangled
Web of Legal-Political Controversy, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW., 550, 551 (2011)
(citing George Will, The Dreamliner Nightmare, WASH. P OST , May 13,
2011,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-0513/opinions/35232327_1_workers-in-washington-state-dreamliners-nlrb);
Glenn M. Taubman, The NLRB v. Boeing: Can Unionized Employers
Expand into Right to Work States?, NEW F ED. INITIATIVES (Fed. Soc’y)
May 26, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publication
s/detail/print/the-nlrb-vs-boeing-can-unionized-employers-expand-to-rightto-work-states.
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Bernstein, supra note 88, at 551. Compare Henry Knight with Angie
Cowan Hamada & Thomas D. Allison, Boeing v. NLRB, ABA SECTION OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW FLASH (ABA Section of Emp’t and Labor
Law, Chicago, IL) Oct. 2011 (Knight explaining Boeing’s position and
Cowan &
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Between the hearing before an administrative law judge and his
decision, the parties settled, and IAM withdrew its charges on
December 8, 2011.86 Boeing agreed to wage increases and expanded
production for the Washington employees, and the union withdrew
its objection to the work at the South Carolina plant proceeding as
planned.87 Costs arising from the dispute were profligate on both
sides, and the resulting bitterness led to the introduction of the Job
Protection Act by Senator Lamar Alexander (R. Tenn.).88 If enacted,
this law would have amended section 10 of the Taft–Hartley Act to
expressly strip the NLRB of the power to order or prevent an
employer from relocating, shutting down, or transferring any existing
or planned facility.
How would the Board and the courts have decided this dispute?
The five-member NLRB decreased to only two members in
December 2011, and the process might have been in indefinite
limbo89 because the Supreme Court had previously held that the
NLRB was void of its statutory powers with fewer than three
members.90 President Obama appointed three additional members
during a Congressional recess in January 2012,91 but how or when
the full Board would have decided Boeing is conjecture. One
recognized legal scholar, Rodney Smolla, president of Furman
University and former dean of law schools at University of
Richmond and Washington and Lee University, predicted before the
settlement that the actions of the company would ultimately be

http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/11
10_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html.
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Lawrence E. Dubé, NLRB’s Controversial Boeing Case Closed; Lafe
Solomon Praises ‘Win-Win’ Settlement, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY LAB.
REP.,(237 DLR AA-1, Dec. 9, 2011).
87
Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After
Union Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, at B3.
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S. 964, 112th Cong. § 1 (2011).
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Joseph Williams, President Obama appoints three to NLRB,
POLITICO, Jan. 4, 2012, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/011
2/71086.html.
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New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635 (2010).
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Williams, supra note 93.
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deemed protected under both the Constitution and federal labor
statutes.92
The federal appeals court for the District of Columbia ruled in
January 2013 that these presidential appointments exceed the power
of the executive under the recess appointments clause.93 The court
reasoned that the intra-session break was not a “recess,” or time
between sessions, during which such power becomes operative.94
The NLRB is expected to appeal this decision; but if it stands, the
result could be invalidation of all orders of this Board. NLRB
Chairman Mark Pearce’s opinion that the appellate court’s decision
“applies only to one specific case”95 is not shared by many prominent
labor attorneys, including G. Roger King. On February 13, 2013,
Mr. King testified on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America and the Coalition for a Democratic
Workplace before a congressional committee that this ruling would
nullify the nearly one thousand Board decisions made since the
expiration of the former chairman’s term on August 27, 2011.96
C. RÜFFERT V. LAND NIEDERSACHSEN97
A Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) state law in Germany required
all companies with public construction contracts in the amount of
10,000 Euro (U.S. $16,212) or more to pay workers the wages in the
construction sector collective bargaining agreement, a commitment
92
Rod Smolla, Analysis: Legal scholar deconstructs Boeing case,
CHARLESTON REGIONAL BUS. J., Nov. 21, 2011, available at http://www.ch
arlestonbusiness.com/news/41851/print.
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U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
94
Noel Canning v. NLRBѽ Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153, 2013 WL 276024
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013).
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Statement by Chairman Pearce on Recess Appointment Ruling,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, http://www.nlrb.gov-news-statementchairman-pearce-recess-appoinment-ruling (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
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The Future of the NLRB: What Noel Canning v. NLRB Means for
Workers, Employers, and Unions, Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ.
and Workforce Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions,
113th Cong. 11 (2013) (testimony of G. Roger King, Counsel, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States and Coalition for a Democratic Workplace),
available at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/Futureoft
heNLRB-NoelCanningTestimony-21313.pdf.
97
Case C-346/06, Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989.
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that also attached to subcontractors.98 One subcontractor paid its
fifty-three Polish workers less than half the union contract amount,
and the government terminated the agreement.99 When the main
contractor went into liquidation, the receiver, Rüffert, petitioned a
German court to award an amount available for creditors’ losses
sustained
from
the
terminated
contract.100
The
Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) upheld the
law and held against the petitioner, but referred to the ECJ the
question of compliance with European law addressing cross-border
services.101
The Court applied the PWD as construed in Laval, holding that
the union contract did not meet the “universally applicable” test for
two reasons: First, the Bundestag (German legislature) had adopted a
law specifying the means in which a collective bargaining agreement
could be rendered universally applicable,102 and this procedure had
not been followed.103 Second, the state law applied only to public
contracts.104
The law in Rüffert is indistinguishable from a long-standing
statute in the United States, the Davis–Bacon Act (Davis–Bacon).105
Despite the absence of any express mention of collectively-bargained
wages in the American law, the act has impacted them by aligning
the prevailing wage in highly unionized sectors with the union
contract.106
Davis–Bacon stemmed from lawmakers’ postDepression concerns that black workers were underpaid.107 This law
requires private companies engaged in contracts with the federal
government for $2000 or more to pay the locality’s prevailing wage
in the particular industry, as determined by the Secretary of Labor.108
98
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Id. ¶ 37.
100
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101
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102
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TARIFVERTRAGSGESETZ I [TVG] 1323, § 5.
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Rüffert, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989 ¶ 27.
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See id.; Bruce Western & Jake Rosenfeld, Unions, Norms, and the
Rise in American Wage Inequality, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 513, 518–19 (2011).
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See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/highway
history/road/s13.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2012).
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It has not been repealed or amended, and in light of Davis–Bacon,
the U.S. courts would likely have approved a statute such as that in
Rüffert.
D. COMMISSION V. LUXEMBOURG109
The Luxembourg Parliament enacted a law mandating that
companies hiring non-domestic workers comply with “public policy
provisions” in that industry’s union contract that covered the entire
country. The European Commission (EC) challenged the legality of
this law under the PWD. In order to meet the “public policy”
element, the EC required Luxembourg to prove that non-enforcement
would pose a serious threat to a fundamental societal interest. Not
only was this burden not met, but the ECJ added that a collective
bargaining agreement applicable to all companies in a sector did not
constitute “public policy.”110
Summarizing the issues in the four cases, it is significant that
Articles 43 and 49 of the TFEU and the PWD were the only
provisions in the vast body of European law that the ECJ was asked
to address. The jurisdiction of the ECJ is substantially limited by the
treaties such as the EC Treaty, which establish the jurisdictional
boundaries of the supra-national ECJ.111 Except for one Article 226
case (Luxembourg),112 the other cases were all Article 234 referral

109
Case C-319/06, Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008
E.C.R. I-04323.
110
Id.
111
The two most frequent types of cases heard by the ECJ are those
filed under Article 226 (formerly Article 169) in which the European
Commission challenges a member state for non-compliance with EU law,
and Article 234 (formerly Article 177), the referral provision, in which a
national court requests a decision on compatibility of domestic law with EU
law. Less frequently, the Court might hear a member state challenge the
Commission under Article 230 (formerly Article 173), alleging that one of
the EU law-making bodies has acted beyond its granted authority. An
Article 230 charge is sometimes described as a “reverse Article 226” case.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing the European Community
arts. 226, 230, 234, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 125 [hereinafter EC
Treaty].
112
Comm’n v. Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, 2008 E.C.R. I-4323; see
supra Part III.D.
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The ECJ is exclusively limited to considering and applying

cases.113
EU law.114

IV. SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIVE AND PROPOSED REGULATION
EU statutory law comes in two forms: regulations and
directives. While both a regulation and directive are directly
enforceable in all member states, directives are more commonly
used. Directives mandate that member states achieve a designated
result prior to a prescribed date by implementation of their own
chosen mechanism under domestic law.115 The directive has no
counterpart in American law.
The Services Directive,116 known as the Bolkestein Directive, is
also relevant, as would be the proposed Monti II regulation if it had
been adopted. Similar to popular names for U.S. statutes, these titles
indicate their respective proponents: Frederick “Fritz” Bolkestein of
the Netherlands, the former Commissioner for the Internal Market,
and Mario Monti, the current Prime Minister of Italy.
A. THE SERVICES DIRECTIVE (“BOLKESTEIN”)
The Bolkestein Directive aims to apply the EU’s “country of
origin” rule for goods to services as well. This principle assures that
“goods produced in [any member state] can be sold in any other
[member state].”117 The principle has been maligned by labor as
instigating a downward spiral for labor standards and strongly
criticized as a tacit approval of social dumping.118 A substantially
altered version of the Bolkestein Directive was finally approved.119
113

See supra Part III.A–C.
See Treaty of Lisbon supra note 34, at 19–22.
115
Id.
116
Directive 2006/123/EC, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 December 2006 on Services in the Internal Market, 2006 O.J.
(L 376) 36.
117
Simon Basketter, Bolkestein: the monster haunting Europe,
SOCIALIST WORKER (Jan. 24, 2006), http://www.socialistworker.co/printart.p
hp?ed=8072.
118
Id.
119
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The country of origin principle is not expressly included, but the
language of the directive reminds member states of the doctrine of
free movement by introducing a mutual-recognition rule in order to
harmonize consumer protections while simultaneously maintaining a
high quality of services.120
B. THE PROPOSED MONTI II REGULATION
If it had been adopted, Monti II would have refined the PWD in
an effort to achieve a balance between facilitating cross-border
services and protecting posted workers.121 However, advocates for
organized labor were displeased with Monti II, deeming it at best
inadequate and at worst an enforcement of the court-imposed
restrictions on trade union activity in Viking and Laval.122 The
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) unequivocally
renounced the draft because it (1) maintained the limits on workers’
collective action right; (2) strengthened Viking’s proportionality test;
and (3) did not recognize social rights as having a priority over
economic freedoms.123 Professor of Public Law at Kings College
London, K.D. Ewing, also chastised the drafters of Monti II for
deferring to national courts124 in determining whether planned union
action is suitable to achieve its objectives.125 He found this
particularly problematic in countries without specialized labor courts,
where such matters are decided by commercial courts with no
experience in labor law.126
Whatever effect Monti II would have had is now moot. On
September 11, 2012, the European Committee for Employment and
Social Affairs announced the withdrawal of the proposed

of the Posted Workers Directive (Apr. 19, 2012) [hereinafter ETUC
Declaration], available at http://etuc.org/a/9917.
120
Id.
121
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Exercise of the Right to
Take Collective Action Within the Context of the Freedom of Establishment
and the Freedom to Provide Services, at 10, COM (2012) 130 final (Mar. 21,
2012).
122
ETUC Declaration, supra note 124.
123
Id.
124
See EWING, supra note 52.
125
Id. at 13–14.
126
Id. at 14.
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regulation.127 This marked the first time the “yellow-card” procedure
added by the Treaty of Lisbon128 was used.129 If at least one-third of
the EU member states are of the opinion that proposed legislation is
contrary to the subsidiarity principle, they can collectively “flag” the
proposed law, triggering a procedure that mandates review by the
EC. The principle of subsidiarity originated in the Treaty of Rome
that established the European Community.130 This cardinal rule of
European law provides that the EU will not act in areas where the
national lawmaking bodies are best suited to rule. Further, the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)131 expressly states
that the EU will defer to member states on the regulation of the right
to strike.132 Thus, despite the leviathan of power that European law
holds over its member states, the subsidiarity principle and the
fledgling “yellow card” procedure illustrate some limits to that
power.

V. ILO CONVENTIONS AND PROVISIONS OF EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER
Much of the criticism railed against the ECJ has stemmed from
the incongruity of Viking and its successor decisions with the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) guarantees of freedom of
association and the right to organize133 as well as the right of workers
to bargain collectively.134 Most EU member states are also parties to
127
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129
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0version/News/yellowcard.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
130
Treaty of Rome, supra note 25, art. 5.
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TFEU, supra note 49.
132
Id.
133
See EWING, supra note 52.
134
See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Right to Organise and Collective
Bargaining Convention, ILO No. 98, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (July 18, 1951). See
also ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
Convention, ILO No. 87 (July 9, 1948).
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the two ILO Conventions.135 Similarly, EU member states share
common membership in the 1950 European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR)136 and the 1961 European Social Charter (ESC).137
The ECHR guarantees freedom of association138 and the ESC, as
revised in 1996, expressly recognizes the workers’ right to strike.139
Moreover, some legal academics view ECHR case law as
recognizing a general right to work.140 Finally, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes the right to
strike,141 made binding on EU member states by the Lisbon Treaty in
2009.142 This obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon might have
presented the most compelling argument against the ECJ’s decisions
in Viking and Laval had its obligatory status not post-dated the
decisions.
An American company on its home turf is not faced with a
multi-national oligarchy over the federal government like companies
in EU member states. Although European law holds priority over the
national laws of member states,143 the latest stance of the ECJ
restricting collective rights of workers is a welcome respite for the
international business from the more usual protection of workers in
Europe.144 Nonetheless, if Monti II is revised in accordance with
pro-union demands, this might be short-lived.

135
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http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm (last updated
Sept. 17, 2012).
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See, e.g., Rory O’Connell, The Right to Work in the ECHR, 2 EUR.
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Id. art. 156. Protocol 10/09 permitted Poland and the United
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CONCLUSION
Traditionally, domestic laws in European countries with their
combined labor-social legislation have been considerably more
labor-friendly than in the United States. The employment-at-will
laws of many American states are alien to European law; European
lawyers and law students may have difficulty grasping the
unemployment concepts of “available for work” and “actively
seeking work” as prerequisites to eligibility of unemployment
compensation. Moreover, European workers have substantial annual
paid-leaves and lengthy compensated maternity and paternal
leaves.145 This contrasts starkly with the unpaid twelve weeks
provided only for employees who meet the work time provisions of
the FMLA.146
The BALPA dispute evidences the impact of Viking and its
progeny, but the demise of Monti II has prohibited any legislative
confirmation of the judiciary’s limitations on workers’ collective
rights. In contrast, federal legislation in the United States specifying
mandatory subjects of bargaining would be unlikely to include a
management decision to import laborers to do specified contract
work within the concept of “terms and conditions.” The ECJ’s
limitation on unions’ right to interfere with a business’ right to
establishment altered the European labor-management legal
environment to closer resemble the structure of U.S. statutory law, at
least temporarily.
The cases examined in this article provide a comparative look at
EU law in an area significant to businesses engaged in trade within
Europe. EU countries are not only heavily unionized, but also have
concomitant domestic and international social obligations under EU,
ECHR, and ESC treaties. The international company and its counsel
must understand the relative bargaining strengths and restrictions of
management and labor unions imposed by these various transnational
laws.
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See supra discussion at Part I.
See supra text accompanying note 11.

